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Evolutionary aesthetics  attempts  to expla in  th e hum an ability to perce-  
ive ob je c ts ,  co n sp ec if ic s  and the surrounding e n v iro n m en t  in an a e s ­
thet ic  m ann er -  i.e. in an em otion a l  and evaluative w ay resulting in 
a positive or negat ive appraisal -  by referring to the evolutionary histo­
ry o f  our functional,  cognit ive make-up. Research has mostly focussed 
on  aesthetic  consid erat ion s  m ade during landscape assessm ent and on 
the role o f  aesthe tic  e le m e n ts  during mate  ch o ic e .  Criticism has been  
expressed repeatedly as to the naturalistic, presumed to be reductionist  
m eth ods and ou t look  o f  an evolutionary  ap proach  to aesthetics.  This 
paper brief ly reviews the outline o f  evolutionary  aesthetics research and 
discusses  three such cr itiques -  functionality  in beau ty  ju dgem ent,  
reductionism, and the recognition o f  cultural and interindividual differ- 
e n c e s .  It argues that philosophical  aesthetics  is not in danger o f  be in g 
unjustly reduced to a neurobiological explanation o f  aesthetic  ju dg em ent 
and exp erience ,  and that evolutionary and traditional humanities  ap- 
proaches can be com p lem entary  in understanding our sense o f  beauty.
Introduction
In 1973, the evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky uttered the now 
famous phrase that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolu- 
tion.” In recent decades, humanities departments worldwide have similarly rec- 
ognized the importance of evolutionary theory and its many applications for
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understanding human nature and its cultural products. While presumably less 
rigorous than evolutionary theory’s steady presence in biology departments -  
few humanities scholars will argue that their subjects do not make sense at all 
when approached from more familiar disciplinary perspectives such as history 
and philosophy -  bio-evolutionary approaches are nonetheless becoming in- 
creasingly prevalent in departments that represent some of the most remarkable 
cultural exponents of human nature.
Yet the advent of evolutionary biology and its related fields has not been un- 
noticed, and has often been met with significant controversy. Critics tend to 
focus heavily on the assumption that considering features of biological evolution 
is a strongly reductionist method, devaluing elements such as cultural signifi­
cance and semantics. Such critiques are, however, more often than not a reflec- 
tion of disciplinary conservatism, sparked by insufficient insight into the theo- 
retical structure and explanatory intent of evolutionary theory. This paper 
addresses the common hostility within humanities departments with regard to 
biological theorization concerning their subjects by discussing the emergence of 
evolutionary aesthetics. After briefly sketching the aims and methods of this 
discipline, it mentions three concerns that have been expressed with regard to 
evolutionary aesthetics’ methods, aims and findings: research in this field is said 
to be at odds with predominantly Kantian thought in western philosophical aes­
thetics, it is critized for being overly reductionist because of its naturalistic out­
look, and finally, it is supposedly unable to account for interindividual differ- 
ences in aesthetic preference.
Evolutionary aesthetics: the story of an emerging paradigm
Historically, the emergence of evolutionary aesthetics almost coincides with the 
formulation of Darwinian evolutionary theory in On the Origin of Species in 
1859. In the mid 19th century, the philosopher and scientist Herbert Spencer 
already hypothesized that art and aesthetics might have emerged from other, 
functional behaviours related to survival and reproduction (Aiken, 1999). Im­
portant foundations of the discipline were also laid down in the experimental 
psychological research of Gustav Theodor Fechner, who developed an empirical, 
bottom-up perspective to aesthetics. His perspective attempted to discover ‘laws 
of liking’, focussing on finding objective properties involved in aesthetic judge-
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ment, rather than a definition of beauty, or the normative implications of such 
judgements (Allesch, 2001).
Methodologically, evolutionary aesthetics is firmly rooted in the discipline of 
evolutionary psychology.1 Researchers in this field argue that the mental struc- 
tures and operations characteristic of a species, such as humans, have arisen 
according to evolutionary processes that are similar, if not the same, than in 
biological evolution. During the Pleistocene epoch, spanning the majority of the 
evolutionary history of the human lineage, ancestral humans were confronted 
with a variety of adaptive problems, ranging from having to find and secure suit- 
able mates, determine whether a new environment was suitable to spend more 
time in, map social interactions, assess cooperative and cheater intent in con- 
specifics, avoid ingesting harmful substances and provide adequate infant care. 
These problems created selection pressures which eventually resulted in func­
tional psychological machinery designed to address them. Human nature can, 
according to many evolutionary psychologists, be regarded as an evolved, spe- 
cies-typical collection of such mechanisms (e.g. Symons, 1992; Thornhill, 2003).
Generally, evolutionary aesthetics researchers propose that the human aes­
thetic sense -  our ability to express negative or positive evaluative judgement of 
the surrounding environment -  reflects such innate cognitive machinery that 
evolved for a functional purpose (Thornhill, 2003). This function is best under- 
stood by referring to evolutionary psychology’s general explanation for the evo- 
lution of emotions. Emotions are thought to have evolved as motivational sys- 
tems for directing behaviour. A particular emotional experience by an individual 
is the eventual outcome of an evolved system of neural rewards and punishments 
(Orians, 2001; Thornhill, 2003). Throughout evolutionary history, elements in 
the environment that were beneficial for survival and reproductive purposes 
were endowed with favourable neural response following sensory perception by 
an individual, whereas elements that were potentially harmful resulted in neural
1 Evolutionary psychology refers here to the classic Santa Barbara account, endorsed by authors 
such as John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, Steven Pinker, Donald Symons, etc. (See, for example, Cosmides, 
Tooby & Barkow, 1992). Other authors have criticized some of the premises of this classic version of 
evolutionary psychology, such as the emphasis on massive mental modularity, and the concept of the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), and the role of culture in psychological and beha- 
vioural evolution (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007; Bolhuis, Brown, Richardson and Laland, 2011). Due to limits 
of space in this paper these accounts are not discussed further, as the field of evolutionary aesthetics is 
most rooted in the classic and foundational interpretation of evolutionary psychology, as described in 
the main text.
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and thus emotional responses that motivated the individual concerned to re- 
move itself from the threat (Pinker, 1997). One of the most fundamental emo- 
tional responses is the experience of beauty -  where favourable conditions are 
present -  and ugliness as its reverse -  when environmental stimuli are perceived 
as harmful or threatening. Thornhill has concisely summarized this point as 
follows: “Beauty experiences are unconsciously realized avenues to high fitness 
in human evolutionary history. Ugliness defines just the reverse.” (Thornhill, 
2003: 9). Wilson similarly stated that human aesthetic propensities “play upon 
the circuitry of the brain’s limbic system in a way that ultimately promotes sur- 
vival and reproduction.” (Wilson, 1984: 61).
The element of functionality with regard to environmental perception and 
affective experience is a recurring feature. Ruso and colleagues write that “hu­
man evolutionary aesthetics is in many ways the study of humble everyday life- 
preferences and feelings evoked by a stimulus without self-conscious thought, 
and yet prevalent on an almost daily basis.” (Ruso, 2003: 279). Kaplan similarly 
states that “aesthetics in this perspective is a functionally based way of respond- 
ing to the environment.” (Kaplan, 1992: 585) Such definitions make abundantly 
clear that research in evolutionary aesthetics inevitably involves a joint examina- 
tion of cognition and emotion. Gazzaniga concisely summarized this as follows: 
“Aesthetics is a special class of experience, neither a type of response nor an 
emotion, but a modus operandi of “knowing about” the world. It is a sensation 
with an attached positive or negative evaluation.” (Gazzaniga, 2009: 208).
Within evolutionary aesthetics, interest has focussed on two main subjects: 
aesthetic considerations made during mate choice, and evaluating habitats in 
terms of their suitability for prolonged occupation, often summarized under the 
subfield of environmental aesthetics. In both cases, immediately perceivable 
characteristics of an environment -  including conspecifics present in it -  can be 
indicators of more fundamental properties that may or may not be fitness- 
enhancing. Researchers in evolutionary aesthetics have tended to focus almost 
exclusively on the importance of visual perception, which explains why the vast 
majority of available theoretical and empirical studies also investigates this sen­
sory modality.2
2 But see e.g. Milinski, 2003 for an olfactory perspective.
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Researchers in environmental aesthetics are interested in uncovering which 
environments as a whole, or which particular features elicit favourable responses 
in observers, assuming that such positive appraisals are the product of evolved 
cognition, indicative of selection pressures during the Pleistocene. Three main 
hypotheses have dominated this field of research. In the savanna hypothesis, 
Orians and Heerwagen (1992, 1993) propose that the significant part of human 
Prehistory that was spent in the savanna environment of Eastern Africa is still 
reflected in current aesthetic preferences for landscape features. They describe 
the most essential human needs, at least during the Pleistocene, as having “to 
find adequate food and water and to protect themselves from the physical envi- 
ronment, predators, and hostile conspecifics.” (1993: 140-141) Savanna envi- 
ronments are well suited for fulfilling these needs, as they often contain features 
like large trees, plant growth, water, focal points in semi-open spaces with 
changes in elevation and relatively unobstructed views of the horizon, which 
would have enabled a clear view of risks and opportunities in the immediate 
surroundings, as well as providing a degree of protection against possible harm 
(Orians 1980). Another notable hypothesis in the field is the prospect-refuge 
theory (Appleton 1975). It predicts that humans should seek out environments 
that provide a maximal balance of prospect -  environmental features that enable, 
for example, spotting resources from a distance -  and refuge -  shelter opportu- 
nities in view of potential danger. Finally, Kaplan (1989, 1992) developed an 
information gathering model of environmental aesthetics, addressing the basic 
need to be able to extract relevant information from the surrounding environ- 
ment while at the same time avoiding the risks that accompany treading in un- 
known territories. Based on a matrix of structural properties of an environment, 
such as coherence, complexity, legibility and mystery, it is argued that by assess- 
ing these properties, one should be able to understand an environment, as well as 
determine its exploratory potential.
Several features of these hypotheses have been tested empirically. In an 
analysis of recurrent features in western landscape painting and garden architec- 
ture, Orians and Heerwagen (1993) found preferences that are strongly consis- 
tent with the predictions made by the savanna hypothesis. In addition, they 
found that prospect-refuge imagery is related to the time of day depicted in 
a particular painting, with a stronger emphasis on refuge elements present when 
the scene was set during dusk or nightfall. Additionally, recent research has as- 
sessed the abovementioned and other findings from environmental aesthetics in
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contemporary contexts and in an applied manner, such as the role of nature 
imagery in advertising (Hartmann & Apaolaza-Ibanez 2010), and psychophysi- 
ological and behavioural effects of exposure to natural stimuli (e.g. Bringslimark, 
Hartig & Patil, 2011, Donovan & Prestemon, 2010, Nielsen & Hansen, 2007).
The second main interest in evolutionary aesthetics is the process of sexual 
selection, and in particular the role of aesthetic considerations during courtship 
display and mate choice. Observations across a wide range of species yield nu- 
merous examples of sexually dimorphic traits, or phenotypic characteristics that 
differ between male and female organisms within a species. In practice, the males 
of a species are often the ones that possess complex, costly traits that appear 
paradoxical and even harmful from a survival perspective, but can relatively eas- 
ily be explained as products of sexual selection (Miller, 2001).3
Two general frameworks have been proposed to account for the evolution of 
signalling traits as well as discriminatory abilities for assessing these traits (Bar­
ber, 1995, Miller, 2001). Good genes sexual selection encompasses a variety of 
ideas such as the handicap principle (Zahavi, 1975), parasite resistance theory 
(Hamilton & Zuk, 1982) and perceivable developmental stability as the outcome 
of immunocompetence (Gangestad, Thornhill & Yeo, 1994, Thornhill & Gang- 
estad, 1993, Watson & Thornhill, 1994). The general argument is that pheno- 
typic traits, such as morphological properties of an organism, can be indicative 
of underlying genetic quality and overall health. Two frequently studied pheno- 
typic features in this regard are symmetry and averageness. The absence of 
symmetry in human bodies and faces is often indicative of developmental nor- 
malcy, and therefore the absence of parasites, bacteria and viruses that might 
interfere with regular development (Gangestad, Thornhill & Yeo 1994). Aver- 
ageness, most clearly recognizable in facial anatomy, is linked to heterozygosity 
which in turn correlates with better immunocompetence (Thornhill & Gang- 
estad, 1993, Watson & Thornhill, 1994).
A second possibility would be to explain phenotypic traits as the outcome 
of a process of runaway selection (Fisher, 1930). Maintaining the gender bias of 
male display and female choice, this theory predicts that a preference arising in 
a female, in response to a male trait, can become caught in a feedback loop that
3 The bias of display traits among males and choice by females is explained by T rivers’ parental in- 
vestment theory (1972), which states that females’ greater investment in gestation and childcare predicts 
greater choosiness when selecting mating partners, as insufficient partners entail much greater repro- 
ductive costs than for males, whose investment is a lot smaller.
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drives both the development of the trait in future generations of males, as well as 
the preference for this trait in female offspring.4 The original preference can be 
arbitrary, with no link between the trait and any underlying genetic quality or 
health, but runaway selection can also occur based on a pre-existing, functional 
preference such as the ones predicted by good genes sexual selection (Barber, 
1995). Naturally, such a feedback loop comes to an end and stabilizes both the trait 
and the preference once they become harmful to the organisms’ survival chances.
Along the lines of evolutionary psychological thinking on emotions as moti- 
vational agents for behavioural choices (e.g. Orians, 2001), evolutionary aesthet- 
ics research on mating generally proposes that aesthetic preferences for features 
such as symmetry and averageness of facial and bodily traits are in fact uncon- 
scious choices for health, developmental stability and good genes, as choices for 
these features result in higher-quality offspring, and thus would have gradually 
become endowed with neural rewards over the course of evolution. Since these 
are functional rather than arbitrary choices, the emphasis tends to be on good 
genes sexual selection.
In sum, research in evolutionary aesthetics can explain, through references to 
the evolution of adaptive neurocognitive mechanisms in mating and habitat 
contexts, why some structural properties appear to elicit neural reward and thus 
positive aesthetic appraisal in the form of beauty judgements. It then becomes 
possible to extent this research to art, or more specifically, to particular features 
that appear to be universally recurrent in terms of their aesthetic appeal. One way 
of doing so would be to map apparently universal aesthetic principles, such as 
symmetry, novelty and moderate complexity, and clarity (van Damme 1996). Ad- 
ditionally, it is possible to extend the signalling interpretation of human aesthetic 
features to artefacts, such as experiencing these as beautiful by -  unconsciously -  
assessing the resources and time spent on their creation (Voland, 2003).
Evolutionary and philosophical aesthetics: 
the scene of a heated debate
In a discussion of Nietzsche’s biologically based aesthetics, Moore (2002) recon- 
structs how the latter’s views did not constitute a major break with previous
4 In line with this, Fisher developed the sexy son hypothesis, which states that a female’s optimal 
mate choice may not be directly related to the immediate benefits she would receive from a male, such as 
resource provision, but may be aimed at producing sons with the highest chance of reproductive success.
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thought in philosophical aesthetics. In the mid 18th century, key figures such as 
Burke already investigated how aesthetic emotion may be explained by psycho­
logical and physiological principles. The turning point in this naturalistic ap­
proach came with the writings of Kant, who proposed a transcendental, idealistic 
aesthetic as opposed to a psychophysiological based one. Among the main ele­
ments of his aesthetic is the required disinterestedness of beauty judgements, 
referring to the absence of any interest in the functionality of a perceived object. 
A new impulse for naturalistic approaches to aesthetics, and eventually evolu- 
tionary aesthetics, did not arrive until the publication of Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory in the mid 19th century (Moore, 2002).5
Despite the presence of naturalistic views on aesthetics in the history of this 
still predominantly philosophical discipline, researchers in the field often reluc- 
tantly respond to the advent of contemporary scientific theories and methods, 
such as those from evolutionary biology and psychology. The predominance of 
Kantian thought in philosophical aesthetics in particular seems to spark resis- 
tance against the evolutionary approach, as these two apparently conflict at vari- 
ous points. In the remainder of this paper, I will address three critiques some- 
times uttered towards evolutionary aesthetics, and I will argue that evolutionary 
and more traditional approaches are not at odds, and even necessarily comple- 
mentary. Content-wise, the focus will be on sexual selection related aesthetics 
rather than environmental aesthetics, as the former is predominant in current 
evolutionary aesthetics research.
Functionality and aesthetic judgement
In The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, originally published in 
1871, Darwin addressed the study of beauty in evolutionary terms by drawing 
parallels between humans and what appears to be aesthetic experience or judge­
ment in the animal world. Upon tackling this subject, he writes:
This sense has been declared to be peculiar to man. I refer here only to the pleasure given by 
certain colours, forms, and sounds, and which may fairly be called a sense of the beautiful; 
with cultivated men such sensations are, however, intimately associated with complex ideas 
and trains of thought. When we behold a male bird elaborately displaying his graceful plumes 
or splendid colours before the female, while other birds, not thus decorated, make no such
5|For a comprehensive overview of naturalism in the history of aesthetics, see Kreft 2007.
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display, it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty of her male partner. As women 
everywhere deck themselves with these plumes, the beauty of such ornaments cannot be dis- 
puted. As we shall see later, the nests of humming-birds and the playing passages of bower- 
birds are tastefully ornamented with gayly coloured objects; and this shows that they must re- 
ceive some kind of pleasure from the sight of such things. (1896: 92)
Darwin noted that seemingly aesthetic phenotypic features in the animal 
world are probably closely intertwined with the process of sexual selection, 
which creates selection pressures for, among other things, traits that are relevant 
for signalling reproductive quality to conspecifics of the opposite sex:
The sweet strains poured forth by many male birds during the season of love are certainly ad- 
mired by the females, of which fact evidence will hereafter be given. If female birds had been 
incapable of appreciating the beautiful colours, the ornaments and voices of their male part- 
ners, all the labour and anxiety exhibited by the latter in displaying their charms before the 
females would have been thrown away; and this it is impossible to admit. (1896: 92)
Darwin’s views are neatly in accordance with the present-day emphasis of 
evolutionary aesthetics on the emergence of the human aesthetic sense through 
mate choice. Research on this subject still tends to study the perception of physi- 
cal attractiveness in conspecifics by making reference to unconscious yet innate 
discriminatory abilities to discern high quality mates from less suitable ones, 
such as the ones implied by the aforementioned process of good genes sexual 
selection, or by the handicap principle.6 While writing works such as On the 
Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) Darwin himself was 
however unaware of the connection between processes such as natural and sex- 
ual selection, and their genetic substrates. He postulated the major theoretical 
principles of natural selection such as random variation, inheritance and selec­
tion, but did not possess sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms that were nec- 
essary for transmitting biological traits to future generations. He did however 
understand the possibility of a runaway process of sexual selection, where male 
display traits and female preferences for these traits evolve jointly and mutually 
strengthening, and thus co-evolve (Miller 2001).
6 Good genes selection should be regarded as the predominant framework for understanding the 
functionality of aesthetic preferences, as a process such as runaway selection does not require a correla- 
tion between phenotypic traits observed and any corresponding genetic quality, although it could be 
equally responsible for the gradual evolution of aesthetic traits. See, for example, Boyd & Richerson 
1985, and Verpooten and Nelissen 2010, 2012.
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Darwin’s uncertainty concerning the mechanisms that created male display 
traits in response to female aesthetic-like choice has been taken by critics to re- 
veal a significant weakness in evolutionary aesthetics research proposing that 
females make aesthetic choices. Assuming that the absence of a clear explanation 
in The Descent o f Man is suggestive of a faulty understanding of the potential 
aesthetic nature of female choice, O’Hear explores whether this aesthetic motiva- 
tion is indeed invalid, or in other words, “the possibility that beauty is linked to 
other more clearly adaptive properties.” (1997: 179) Specifically, he thinks female 
preferences may be directed towards favourable qualities such as strength and 
superiority. Striking ornamental display, for example, could be linked to territo- 
rial dominance, which would be the females’ actual interest, rather than the aes­
thetic properties of any corresponding display traits.7 Famous cases such as the 
peacock’s tail for example, typically explained as a good genes sexual selection 
motivation aesthetic choice, are regarded by critics as perhaps merely a fuctional 
preference for underlying health. O’Hear supports this argument by making 
reference to the work of Darwin’s contemporary, the evolutionary biologist Al­
fred Russell Wallace.
Wallace developed a similar trajectory of evolutionary thought to account for 
the origin and development of species, but differed notably in opinion when it 
came to the principles of sexual selection. When discussing ornamentation, he 
distinguished between ornaments present in all organisms of a species, and or- 
naments present only in males. The first category was described as being a means 
for species recognition, thus explaining them independent of the mechanism of 
sexual selection. Predominantly male ornaments in turn, Wallace thought, were 
non-functional side-effects of an animal physiology aimed at bright colours and 
sounds, only constrained by natural selection. The increasingly outspoken pres- 
ence of such ornaments during mating seasons or rituals was explained as the 
outcome of a stored surplus of energy. Females supposedly did not possess such 
ornaments as they needed to be a lot more camouflaged around their vulnerable 
offspring (Miller, 2001). Additionally, Wallace hypothesized that female choice 
was not actually based on aesthetic considerations, but rather on utilitarian mo- 
tivations such as finding healthy partners.
7 “How might it be possible to decide between the view that aesthetic preference in animals is purely 
aesthetic or that what looks like aesthetic preference to us is really a preference for other qualities which 
go along with the aesthetic and are not chosen via any aesthetic appreciation?” (O’Hear, 1997: 180).
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In addition to sexual selectionist theory, it is necessary to consider the emer­
gence of knowledge on genetics and inheritance. Unknown to Darwin, the basic 
rules of inheritance on a genetic level were established during his lifetime by the 
Czech friar and scientist Gregor Mendel, but it would take until the fourth and 
fifth decade of the twentieth century before these revolutionary paths of scien- 
tific discovery were joined together in what is now widely known as ‘the modern 
synthesis’ (e.g. Fisher, 1930). From an evolutionary aesthetics perspective, this 
synthesis allows for understanding aesthetic experiences and preferences in 
a functional way, as was described earlier. Any preference observed need not be 
arbitrary -  although this may still be the case -  but is potentially a naturally se- 
lected emotional, affective experience acting as a motivational agent for making 
functional choices.
These two considerations -  functionality in aesthetic judgement and genetics 
at the basis of natural selection -  make for a serious readjustment of original 
Darwinian thought on possible aesthetic motivations in non-human animal fe­
male choice for male ornamentation and display. As a consequence, what ap- 
pears to be lacking in O’Hear’s critique of Darwinian-based evolutionary aes- 
thetics, is the recognition that good genes sexual selection explains how an 
aesthetic preference is linked to a more functional choice such as overall health 
and strength. While it is a fact that Darwin was not fully aware of such an uncon- 
scious motivation, this does not refute his suggestion that beauty judgement 
plays a role in display and mate choice, nor is it necessary to revive Wallace’s 
views on sexual selection. Trying to do this is also not advisable in itself, given 
the numerous inconsistencies between Wallace’s writings and what is currently 
known about the processes and mechanisms involved in the evolution and de- 
velopment of reproductively linked traits (Miller, 2001).
Of course the option still remains that elaborate peacocks’ tails evolved 
through runaway sexual selection, which can in principle act upon arbitrary, 
non-fitness related traits. In this case, it could be true that the female preference 
for such tails can be sustained after accidentally arising -  such as in the case of 
a mutation -  if the preference is not harmful, i.e. if it doesn’t correspond to 
a property in a male organisms that is severaly disadvantageous for survival and 
reproductive purposes (O’Hear, 1997). Yet this possibility overlooks the body of 
research providing insight into the precise connections between male phenotypic 
traits and their overall reproductive quality, as is evident from the aforemen- 
tioned research on, for example, immunocompetence theory (see Barber, 1995).
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Such research indicates that it is unlikely that costly preferences for equally 
costly traits would persist if they were not compensated by functional benefits.
Reductionism and the levels of explanation
In The Descent o f Man, Darwin acknowledged that a significant part of human 
aesthetic experience and judgement depends on elements of semantics, educa- 
tion and culture. While “man and many of the lower animals are alike pleased by 
the same colours, graceful shading and forms, and the same sounds,” (1896: 93) 
he also thought that “no animal would be capable of admiring such scenes as the 
heavens at night, a beautiful landscape, or refined music; but such high tastes are 
acquired through culture, and depend on complex associations; they are not 
enjoyed by barbarians or by uneducated persons.” (1896: 93) Indeed, “with culti- 
vated men such sensations are, however, intimately associated with complex 
ideas and trains of thought.” (1896: 93) Darwin thus recognized that human 
aesthetic experience is often, yet not always, tied up with rationality and cultiva- 
tion, but precisely this element has been regarded by critics as conflicting with 
Kantian aesthetics. Scruton writes:
And one thing is surely right in Kant’s argument, which is that the experience of beauty, like 
the judgement in which it issues, is the prerogative of rational beings. Only creatures like us -  
with language, self-consciousness, practical reason, and moral judgement -  can look on the 
world in this alert and disinterested way, so as to seize on the presented object and take pleas- 
ure in it. (2009: 33, original emphasis)
As such -  at least if Kantian aesthetics is taken as a default position -  it ap- 
pears that Darwin surpasses the importance of rationality in human aesthetic 
judgement, thus making his parallels with the non-human world of animals ap- 
parently illegitimate. In this sense, evolutionary aesthetics is thought to be reduc­
tionist because it unjustly parallels humans with sometimes very distant animal 
relatives. A way out of this can perhaps be found in Davies’s compromise posi- 
tion on the phylogenetic roots of the aesthetic, i.e. the extent to which we share 
our ability to aesthetically appreciate the outside world with non-human species. 
He rejects on the one hand the liberal position that all “pleasurable or unpleasur- 
able perceptual experience” can be regarded as aesthetic, which would almost 
automatically equate that non-human animal aesthetic-like responses are the
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same as human ones (2012: 15).8 The other extreme take on aesthetic experience 
is the 18th century Enlightenment view, endorsed by Kant and others, which 
basically states that an aesthetic experience is contemplative, largely if not com- 
pletely detached from utilitarian motivations, often directed towards the percep- 
tion of formalist properties, and requiring a particular kind of interaction be­
tween imagination and understanding (Davies, 2012).
According to Davies, neither of these two positions appears sufficient to ac­
count for both non-human animal aesthetic-like responses, as well as human 
aesthetic experience that has been commonly described in philosophical aesthet- 
ics as being complemented with cognitive sophistication. Instead, seemingly 
aesthetic responses in birds, non-human primates and other species might per- 
haps be regarded as “affective states that are action-motivating” as “proto- 
aesthetic, at least in the sense that human aesthetic responses arose from that 
kind of reaction.” (2012: 10-11). This way, Davies acknowledges the phylogenetic 
roots of the human ability for aesthetic appreciation, while at the same time al- 
lowing for a distinction between the human and non-human animal nature of 
such appreciation -  including the possibility, but not the necessity, of highly 
advanced cognitive involvement or detached contemplation in humans.
Another way of describing evolutionary aesthetics as reductionist is nature, 
is to regard the explanation of cultural and mental phenomena in biological 
terms as overly simplifying. More specifically, human aesthetic experience is 
often thought to be so complex that it cannot possibly be grasped in biological 
terms. Attempting to explain aesthetic experience and judgement by making 
reference to features such as neural reward mechanisms and psychological adap- 
tations reduces, according to some, unjustly its cognitive and semantic richness 
(e.g. Van Gerwen, 2011).
Such concerns can relatively easily be addressed by describing an indeed very 
complex phenomenon such as aesthetic experience in terms of different explana- 
tory levels. Reductionism is then not an attempt to reduce for example cultural 
or semantic elements to a biological level, but tries to account for these experi- 
ences with the help of more basic levels of explanation, in addition to higher- 
level explanations. One such way of looking at a phenomenon at different levels
8|When discussing aesthetic adaptations in humans, Symons has voiced a similarly liberal position 
when stating: “All adaptations are aesthetic adaptations, because all adaptations interact in some way 
with the environment, external or internal, and prefer certain states to others.” (Symons pers. comm. In 
Thornhill, 2003: 9)
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is by studying aesthetic experience and judgement both in a cultural and phi­
losophical way -  focussing on individual experience, semantic content, imagina- 
tion, etc. -  as well as with bio-evolutionary methods -  analyzing the neurobio- 
logical structure of the ability to appreciate objects, other individuals and the 
surrounding environment in terms of beauty and ugliness.9
Cultural and interindividual differences 
in aesthetic preferences
An evolutionary approach to aesthetics suggests that the human ability to appre- 
ciate objects, physical environments and animate beings in terms of beauty or 
ugliness is a universal propensity. However, this does not mean that all cultures 
must have the same aesthetic preferences. In a parallel with language, Davies 
(2012) explains that while our capacity for language learning and speaking is 
very likely an adaptation, this doesn’t necessarily imply that all people worldwide 
must speak the same language. Instead, “we should be looking for widespread 
consensus over at least some aesthetic assessments within a culture and the pos- 
sibility of coming to understand the different aesthetic preferences of other 
groups.” (2012: 48) Aside from such a consensus -  which may be a set of basic, 
universal aesthetic principles10 -  evolution thus also allows for cultural variation.
Cultural differences in aesthetic preference may in itself rely on an evolved 
propensity to seek variation. In The Descent o f Man, Darwin wrote:
As the great anatomist Bichat long ago said, if every one were cast in the same mould, there 
would be no such thing as beauty. If all our women were to become as beautiful as the Venus 
de’ Medici, we should for a time be charmed; but we should soon wish for variety; and as soon 
as we had obtained variety, we should wish to see certain characters a little exaggerated be­
yond the then existing common standard. (1896: 585)
9 Within evolutionary research on human and non-human animal behaviour, the explanatory 
framework often used to integrate different levels of explanation is Tinbergen’s four questions. These 
imply that a trait, for example a behaviour, can be studied at both a proximate and an ultimate level. The 
proximate level involves ‘how’ questions concerning how the trait develops in an individual, both by 
referring to the causal mechanisms and ontogeny, or how the trait develops over the course of an indi- 
viduals lifetime. The ultimate level, the ‘why’ questions, refer to the phylogenetic history of a trait - how 
the presence of the trait within a species is related to its presence in other species - and functional, adap- 
tive explanations for its emergence (Tinbergen, 1963).
10|See, for example, Dutton 2002, van Damme 1996.
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The quest for variation can therefore explain why aesthetic preferences can 
change over time or across cultures, without any clear, functional reason (Cun- 
nigham & Shamblen, 2003). In some cases, changing social and ecological cir- 
cumstances can alter preferences for particular traits, such as evidence of afflu- 
ence and health in societies where nutritional conditions are poor. Correlations 
have also been found between a preference for neonate, softer traits in women’s 
faces at times when the economy prospers, whereas opposite traits tend to be 
positively assessed during economic downfall (Pettijohn & Tesser, 1999). An- 
other reason that applies more specifically to temporal changes in aesthetic pref- 
erence can be the tendency of a society’s elite to maintain their external signals of 
high status by adopting new and different signals if the previous ones become 
increasingly average and are adopted by the society as a whole (Cunningham & 
Shamblen, 2003).
In attempting to understand how evolutionary aesthetics can explain inter- 
individual differences, it is relevant to include neurocognitive research on this 
subject.11 By studying individuals’ brains in a variety of conditions and with dif­
ferent sets of stimuli, it becomes possible to understand how such differences in 
aesthetic appreciation work on a neurobiological level, and consequentially, how 
they eventually become clear in aesthetic experience and judgement on a more 
conscious level. fMRI research by Kirk and colleagues (2009) with groups of 
architects and non-architects found that the level of expertise present influences 
the cognitive processing of relevant stimuli, in this case architectural creations, 
but also the amount of neural rewards evoked by these stimuli. This means that 
an individual more familiar with a particular kind of representations can experi- 
ence heightened aesthetic responses. Such an effect may be due to the mecha- 
nism of neuroplasticity, which broadly refers to the brain’s capacity to establish 
new neural connections following new experiences or the perception of repre­
sentations, while deleting old or less useful ones. In this manner, knowledge is 
again joint with emotion in order to produce aesthetic effects (Jacobsen, 2010).
nl Concerning individual variation, it is important to note that the process of evolution through 
natural or sexual selection precisely takes such individual variation as a starting point. If there was no 
variation in a particular trait, for example the extent to which an organism is capable of assessing the 
reproductive quality of a conspecific in aesthetic terms, evolution could not act upon the trait to select 
more successful variations to maintain in future generations.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I outlined the methodological apparatus and thematic focus of 
evolutionary aesthetics, describing how it presents the human ability to express 
evaluative emotional judgement in terms of beauty and ugliness as an evolved 
motivational mechanisms with functional underpinnings. Three important cri- 
tiques of evolutionary aesthetics were addressed, only representing a limited set 
of questions that can be asked at the intersection of evolutionary and more tradi- 
tional humanities approaches to this subject. I argued that comments such as the 
one made by O’Hear concerning the potential functional, rather than aesthetic 
motivation at play in female choice reflects a one-sided interpretation of original 
Darwinian aesthetics, losing its presumed validity in the light of fundamental 
additions to Darwinian thought such as the ones made in the extended synthesis. 
Additionally, I pointed out that the often feared reductionist agenda of evolu- 
tionary aesthetics is valid in scientific terms, i.e. in trying to approach our ability 
for aesthetic judgement on a more fundamental, biological level. Finally, I pro- 
vided suggestions in support of the idea that looking at the evolutionary founda- 
tions of our aesthetic sense does not equal stating that there is no room for cul­
tural or interindividual variation. In this regard, neurocognitive research may 
prove to be particularly enligthening for our understanding of aesthetic experi- 
ence and judgement on multiple levels.
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